the deregulation, which has taken place from the 1980s onwards, did not erode its comparative advantages. Until now, this strategy has appeared to be successful, as exemplified by the adaptive efforts made in the fields of investment funds, private banking and financial engineering over the past twenty years or so, as well as more recently in the areas of estate management, securitisation, venture capital and reinsurance (OECD, 2008) . To avoid any misunderstanding, it should be stated that even when focussing on certain success factors and current challenges for this comparably young and fast-growing financial centre, we will neither be advocating a "Luxembourg model" -see Clark and Wójcik"s (2005) criticism of generalising case studies -nor do we intend to base our argument exclusively on a regional innovation system approach. We are, rather, interested in the way a specific local environment with its corporate and public actors and the resultant institutional setting is intertwined with overarching international development trends and regulatory constraints.
The first part of the paper reviews the literature concerning specialised financial centres, focusing on the geography of finance and offshore issues. The second part presents the methodology and data. In the third part, we discuss the contribution of the financial centre to the national and regional economy and examine how Luxembourg has dealt with the crisis from 2007 onwards. More specifically, the paper examines the extent to which Luxembourg 4 has developed endogenous competitive advantages going beyond regulatory incentives. The fifth part illustrates the strategy of innovation followed by Luxembourg and the remediation strategies developed to ensure the sustainability of the IFC. The final part concludes by stressing Luxembourg"s potential to adapt to the present turbulent times and considers some of the long-term perspectives.
Scholarly debates on specialised financial centres
Over the past decade, numerous attempts have been made to classify financial centres in a hierarchical way, considering either quantitative indicators related to the presence of company headquarters (Choi, Park and Tschoegl, 2003) or the relative size of financial markets (Poon, Eldredge and Yeung, 2004) , or a mix of quantitative indicators and assessments from the industry itself (City of London, 2010) . While the ranking of financial centres may vary according to which indicators are used, geographers tend to divide them into three major groups: (1) world financial centres such as London, New York and Tokyo, which are unchallenged in their respective areas; (2) second-tier financial centres such as Paris, Frankfurt, Amsterdam or Milan, which clearly dominate the national and sometimes the regional area; and (3) sub-centres such as Munich, Geneva, Dublin or Luxembourg, which have developed special competencies (Grote, 2009 ). The first two categories seem to have attracted most of the scholarly interest, especially London (Thrift 1994; Taylor et al, 2003; Roberts, 2008) , New York (Schwartz, 1992; Longcore and Rees, 1996; Pohl 2004) , and Frankfurt (Grote, Lo and Harrschar-Ehrnborg, 2002; Grote, 2008; Faulconbridge, 2004; König et al, 2007; Schamp, 2009 ).
However, work examining the importance and sustainability of sub-centres within the global economy has been rather limited (see Murphy 1998; Sokol 2007) . Luxembourg is no 5 exception to this. Some comparative studies conducted at the European level still ignore the city despite its key role within the geography of European finance Karreman, 2009) , while other worldwide studies do not comment on the specificities of the location (Poon, 2003; Poon, Eldredge and Yeung, 2004) , or consider such international financial centres only as offshore centres (see Cassis 2006) . As a result, most of the studies on the development of the financial industry in Luxembourg have been produced by consultancies or by a small number of academics (Hübsch 2004; Franz, 2005; Bourgain and Pieretti, 2006; Pieretti, Bourgain and Courtin, 2007; Walther and Schulz 2009 ).
Interestingly, the literature on sub-centres seems to be divided into two bodies of literature, which do not often overlap, as was already noted by Murphy (1998) over ten years ago. One of the main challenges when studying sub-centres is, therefore, to combine the geography of finance approach, which deals primarily with the centrifugal and centripetal forces explaining the concentration of financial activities, and the approach developed by scholars of international relations and political economy, dealing with the legal and regulatory incentives of offshore financial centres and state sovereignty. As noted by Hudson (2000) , some convergence between the two approaches has been seen recently. This is all the more necessary given that far from being isolated and purely opportunistic, the rise of the so-called offshore centres is structurally linked to the changing world economy (Hudson, 1998) , and in particular the internationalisation of capital (Palan, 2003) .
As with any other financial centres, three major types of factors influence the development of sub-centres: the nature of financial products, classical Marshallian externalities, and social networks (Gordon and McCann, 2000) . Firstly, as showed by Clark and O"Connor (1997, page 95) , "financial products often have a distinct spatial configuration of information 6 embedded in their design". Small financial centres are more likely to specialise in opaque products which require a greater degree of non-codified knowledge, such as private equity, mergers and acquisitions transactions, and in translucent products such as hedge funds, rather than in transparent products such as currency exchange, which tend to be concentrated in a limited number of large IFCs, in order to benefit from economies of scale. Given that opaque products have a tendency to be transformed into more transparent products, IFCs can maintain their competitive advantages in two ways: by developing their intermediation capacity as gatekeepers mediating between outsiders from global markets and local knowledge, and by transforming transparent products into translucent products by attracting skilled traders (Faulconbridge et al, 2007) .
Secondly, there is no doubt that labour market pooling, the supply of intermediate goods and technological and informational spillovers play a fundamental role in the formation of financial sub-centres (Porteous, 1999; Gehrig, 2000; Storper and Venables, 2004) . Even though agglomeration economies favour those markets where the density of employment and of companies is at its highest, the growth of smaller-sized financial centres can also follow from extreme specialisation, encouraged by the exploitation of a niche related to national sovereignty. Certain initial comparative advantages can then result in a cumulative process in which the location of banks that are attracted by framework conditions can subsequently increase the attractiveness of the location for banks that are not yet established there (Grote, 2008) .
Thirdly, small international financial centres also connect individuals who share social and cultural values and interact within social networks (Thrift, 1994) . The exchange of these values is essential to maintaining trust and reputation, the two pillars upon which much of 7 financial intermediation relies. Social relationships, informal rules and interpersonal networks established in business are thus constitutive of markets (Peck, 2005) . The effectiveness of these standards and rules is greatly enhanced by the physical proximity between actors, which is usually found in financial districts and small-sized IFCs (Longcore and Rees, 1996; McDowell, 1997) .
The second body of literature relevant to the case of specialised IFCs deals with the rise of offshore finance and the reworking of state sovereignty (Roberts, 1994; Hudson, 1998; Vlcek, 2008) . A major contribution of this literature has been to analyse the diversity of financial centres and to distinguish between international financial centres, offshore centres and pure tax havens (Palan, Murphy and Chavagneux, 2010 ). An offshore financial centre is usually considered as a country or jurisdiction that makes its living "mainly by attracting overseas financial capital" and offers "foreign businesses and well-heeded individuals (…) low or no taxes, political stability, business friendly regulation and laws, and above all discretion" (The Economist, 2007, page 3), whereas tax havens are regarded as "countries that have enacted tax legislation especially designed to attract the formation of branches and subsidiaries of parent companies based in heavily-taxed industrial nations" (Starchild, 1994, page 1).
The heterogeneity of financial centres has long presented a problem to such classification (IMF, 2000) , as is well illustrated by the case of Luxembourg. On the one hand, Luxembourg has been regularly identified as an offshore financial centre (Palan, 2003; Zoromé, 2007) , due to its favourable income tax rates and banking secrecy rules. On the other hand, the country is a robust, efficient and well-supervised financial centre with sound institutions and has developed one of the most stringent regulatory regimes with regard to money laundering, 8 which has nothing in common with badly-run tax havens in the Caribbean Sea or the Pacific (IMF, 2002) . As Schaus (CSSF, 2004, page 5) , former Director General of Luxembourg"s Financial Sector Supervisory Authority (CSSF) argues, Luxembourg cannot be easily reduced to one or the other category: "Luxembourg has never been an offshore financial centre, as it has never developed in the absence of tax or regulatory constraints. It will never be an onshore financial centre like any others either, as it will always be dependent on foreign capital".
Another contribution of this approach has been to show that offshore finance does not act on the margins of the international financial system but rather is closely interrelated with it (Palan, Murphy and Chavagneux, 2010) . Although the statistical data remain unclear, a great deal of evidence suggests that offshore finance processes or manages a huge proportion of the money coming from or going into the world economy, estimated at 51% of all cross-border assets and liabilities -about $ 5 to 7 trillion in 2007 (The Economist, 2007) . Accordingly, offshore financial centres are now not limited solely to tax avoidance but rather are deeply integrated into the globalised economy. A third contribution of that approach has been to make clear that offshore finance did not appear from nowhere but rather was encouraged by certain Western countries, at least until the late 1990s when a campaign against "harmful tax competition" (OECD, 1998) and pressure from the EU on international policy regarding offshore activities developed (Hampton and Christensen, 1999) .
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Methodology and data
Our analysis of the impact of the crisis on the financial industry in Luxembourg is developed using primary and secondary data from various sources, before and after the financial crisis.
Drawing inspiration from the study carried out by Taylor et al. (2003) 
Luxembourg as a global specialist
Because of the quality and depth of its financial services, Luxembourg has been described as a "global specialist" (City of London, 2010) . It is considered to be the leading private banking centre in the Eurozone, the second-largest mutual fund centre in the world, and the leading captive reinsurance market within the EU (LFF, 2009 ). This section examines the origins of its niche policy and the consequences of the financial downturn, and presents some of the factors that allowed Luxembourg to be resilient through these turbulent times. One of the characteristics of Luxembourg as a financial centre is its domination by foreign banks. As shown in Table 2 , branches and subsidiaries from Germany constituted a third of the total number in Luxembourg in 2009, followed by banks from France, Italy, and Switzerland. This shows that, unlike in some offshore financial centres, banks in Luxembourg are far from being empty shells with merely a minimal physical presence in the country (the average of workers per bank was 177 in 2009).
Today, the financial sector is by a considerable margin the main driver of the national economy. With 55,000 jobs directly linked to the financial services, the sector accounts for 22% of domestic employment, 31% of public revenue and 38% of Gross Domestic Product (Deloitte, 2009) . Table 2 shows that the sector experienced strong annual average growth Sources: CSSF, CAA, Cetrel and IGSS. 
Tax incentives and spillover effects
One of the reasons why Luxembourg performed well during the crisis is related to the fact that tax incentives are also complemented by spillover effects. Even though the origins of Luxembourg"s financial centre are due in large part to an ongoing and highly-adaptable niche policy, the role of the latter is increasingly added to by other locational advantages. These include both endogenous agglomeration advantages, as well as Luxembourg"s strong ties to international networks.
As These factors promote face-to-face contacts. It is true, as Boschma (2005) argues, that spatial proximity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for localised knowledge spillovers to develop. In an urban area, financial firms require in particular cognitive and social proximity, the former being related to the capacity of actors to share the same knowledge base and expertise, and the latter being related to the embeddedness of business relations and trust in a social context. However, as a small IFC, Luxembourg provides strong advantages in terms of both kinds of proximity: cognitive proximity is encouraged by the specialisation of the financial industry in certain products or operations, whereas social proximity is encouraged by the dense network of formal and informal relations developed between peers and/or competitors in the City, and between them and the political-regulatory sphere. As a partner in a London-based law firm argues: "We very much benefit from the support of service-sector institutions such as the CSSF and to professional bodies. (…) Of course, the entire legal and regulatory environment is a key feature for our firm. But proximity matters, especially when we have to discuss with ministries" (interview, 11 June 2007).
The development of the financial industry particularly benefited from the "access to a skilled labour supply". It appears that the well-educated and multilingual workforce of Luxembourg offers a true advantage when compared to other financial markets throughout the world.
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Luxembourg has managed to create a sufficiently large labour pool possessing appropriate skills and which is attractive to institutions in Europe. When compared with other financial markets such as Dublin, Luxembourg does indeed offer interesting opportunities. The
Luxembourg-based financial industry had resulted in the development of highly specialised regional cross-border labour pooling (Walther and Dautel, 2010) . More than 150,000 commuters cross the border every day from neighbouring France, Germany, and Belgium, contributing to the rise of a functionally-integrated cross-border metropolitan area of around 800,000 inhabitants, comparable in size to Geneva or Basel, two other knowledge-intensive
European metropolitan centres (Sohn, Reitel and Walther, 2009 ).
The ability to attract senior managers is an important issue in terms of diversification of activity and the development towards less back-office activities. In fact, core financial activities are organised in a very hierarchical and uneven way at the international level: as regards asset management, for example, the core business is still operated in a few large financial centres such as London, Paris and Zurich, for British, French and Swiss banks respectively. Being innovative in that kind of business is certainly important for Luxembourg if the city wants to develop more core activities in the value chain of the finance industry (Pieretti, Bourgain and Courtin, 2007) . The bankers interviewed agreed that there was clearly a lack of experienced people, but they also recognised that the increasing international recognition of Luxembourg as a specialised financial centre makes recruitment somewhat easier than a decade ago, especially for young, highly motivated graduates.
Additional adaptation strategies
As shown above, adaptation to changing regulatory and market environments has been closely linked to various types of innovation. The fund industry, for example, has been 20 diversifying from traditional retail funds to alternative investment funds (such as private equity, property or hedge funds) over recent years. About 700 such funds were domiciled in June 2009, with a total of € 128.5 billion under management. A degree of uncertainty is currently affecting these funds, due to the proposed AIFM European Directive, which seeks to ensure that all investment fund managers are subject to harmonised regulatory standards (EC, 2009) . Their funds will be authorised to operate under a passport system throughout the EU once they have been authorised in one country. As an alternative to Cayman or Bermuda funds, Luxembourg is expected to benefit from the new global supervision of alternative funds and the re-domiciliation trend. This could mark a certain convergence between hedge funds and UCITS funds, which are also evolving rapidly. In 2009, Luxembourg adopted the new UCITS IV directive to enhance the harmonised European regime for investment funds (Ernst & Young, 2010 ), which will make it possible for an investment fund to be managed by an investment company located in another country within the EU. The new directive is expected to lead to cross-border mergers between funds, and contribute to the rationalisation of the industry to the benefit of Luxembourg (interview, 21 st April 2010).
More recently, and clearly as a reaction to the financial crisis, the state and its business development agencies have been strongly engaged in the quest for further diversification of products and (geographical) markets for the financial sector. To date, the two most promising emerging markets increasingly targeted by Luxembourg"s fund industry are Islamic finance and microfinance.
Islamic finance
Islamic finance, i.e. the development and handling of Sharia-compliant financial products, in 
Conclusion
This paper has examined the question of why some specialised IFCs have proven resilient to the recent financial crisis, and suggests that Luxembourg"s development strategy has been comparatively successful for two main reasons.
Firstly, the increasing concentration of banks and financial services companies has over time created agglomeration economies and contributed to making Luxembourg one of the few global specialists in finance. Accordingly, the era of exclusive tax niche policies appears to be over. Even though Luxembourg was originally developed by a niche policy, there is growing empirical evidence that the city has generated its own "local buzz". Luxembourg seems to benefit from a diversified and qualified cross-border labour pool, which gives the financial centre an international status and contributes to explaining its dominance as a hub for cross-border fund distribution within Europe. Luxembourg also benefits from being a small environment, which means that national and regulatory institutions can be easily approached. Our results are consistent with previous studies, which highlight the importance of agglomeration effects and show that the growth of the financial sector produces a significant increase in business services and non-financial market services (Bourgain and Pieretti, 2006) .
Secondly, the development of the financial industry in Luxembourg shows that a strategy of continuous innovation has been adopted to maintain the comparative competitiveness of the financial centre. This "first mover" strategy has enabled Luxembourg to adopt quickly a 25 number of new European regulations, while maintaining distinctive advantages (including banking secrecy). It remains true, however, that the main drivers of the financial sector remain the investment fund industry and private banking. Strategies designed by public and private actors to develop alternatives, such as Islamic finance and microfinance, are still very limited in terms of assets under management. Nevertheless, these two emerging activities appear to be strongly reliant on the specific local context both in terms of institutional environment as well as in terms of location-specific expertise.
The aftermath of the financial crisis shows that Luxembourg is navigating a narrow path. On the one hand, most of the actors in the financial sector are aware that, because of European and international regulatory pressure, approaches to risk management will have to be reassessed, transparency improved, clients" needs taken even more seriously, and more rigorous controls implemented. But, on the other hand, Luxembourg remains highly dependent on the skills that have allowed it to be successful (Falk, 2009 "remain what they are" -which is the national motto ("Mir wëlle bleiwe wat mir sin"), painted on an ancient house in medieval Luxembourg City.
